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### 1

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics

Younkins 2k (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm, JMP)

Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion.

If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should:

before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it;

ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...;

recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and

begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes.

Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

### 2

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is trending upwards – it’s key to CCP export markets and energy imports

Myers and Hongbo 13 (Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue, Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, each answering a question from the Inter-American Dialogue “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue: "Latin America became a strategically important market for Chinese exporters a few years ago following decreases in demand for Chinese goods from Europe and the United States. Chinese exports to Europe fell 9 percent in 2011 in comparison with export levels in 2010, for example, and exports to the United States fell 5 percent. As U.S. and European demand continues to lag, Latin American nations should expect sustained interest in their markets and new market- and efficiency-seeking investments. As China continues its process of industrial upgrading, Latin America will also see more in the way of high-tech goods, as well as marketing of distinctly Chinese brands. Chinese cars are already being sold in several Latin American countries, including Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. And Chinese cell phones and computers are increasingly popular among Latin American consumers. As the former LAC director general at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yang is uniquely familiar with both the promises and pitfalls of trade with Latin America. While Latin America remains an appealing market for exports, Chinese producers and officials are painfully aware of growing protectionism in response to China's market-seeking endeavors. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited nationalization and trade protectionism trends among the top 20 notable events in the region in 2012. China expects to avoid protectionist measures by building mutually beneficial, 'win-win' trade relations. Chinese government and commercial entities in Latin America will indeed be working to build stronger trade relations in the coming years." A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."

#### Bolstering US influence pushes China out – Columbia proves it determines contracts

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### China’s exports are key to a sustainable economy – recent shocks mean it’s on the brink

Holland 7/9 (Tom, writer of the South China Morning Post’s Monitor column, internally citing statistics from ADBI, the Asian Development Bank Institute, Dr. Yuqing Xing, professor of economics an director of Asian economic policy at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, PhD in economics from the University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign, MA and BA from Peking University, South China Morning Post Monitor, July 9, 2013, “Despite rebalancing, exports still vitally important to China,” <http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1278239/despite-rebalancing-exports-still-vitally-important-china>, alp)

Unfortunately, the figure for gross exports isn't much use either. In an economy where all the value of all exports was produced domestically, then gross exports would give a good idea of external demand. But real supply chains don't work like that. Chinese factories import flash memory chips from Japan, displays from Korea and processors from the United States, which they then assemble into smartphones for sale around the world. So although the face value of China's exports may be high, the value added by China's factories is often relatively low. But although gross exports aren't much help in gauging the true importance of external demand, net exports don't work either. If all China's imports were components destined for re-export, the net figure would do the trick. But they aren't. Imports are also consumed domestically, not least by Chinese buying their own smartphones. To estimate the real contribution of external demand, we would have to account for the proportion of China's imports destined for re-export after assembly. Although these processing imports have fallen relative to China's total imports over recent years, as the first chart shows, they still make up a sizeable share of China's overall inbound goods trade. In an attempt to do exactly that, Xing Yuqing and Manisha Pradhananga at the Asian Development Bank Institute have come up with a measure of external demand which strips out China's processing imports. Then, for good measure, they have factored in an allowance for foreign direct investment into China, which remains driven largely by external, rather than domestic, demand. They found that although the share of external demand in China's GDP has fallen from its high of 28 per cent reached in 2007, in 2011 it still accounted for 22 per cent of overall economic output. As the second chart shows, that's 10 times as great as the share implied by the net export figure commonly used by economists. Xing and Pradhananga conclude that despite efforts to rebalance the economy towards domestic consumption, China is still heavily dependent on demand from the rest of the world, and that its growth remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. In other words, if tomorrow's trade numbers are as dismal as many analysts expect, it will be an ominous sign indeed for China's growth outlook.

#### Chinese economic decline goes global and causes nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 – professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 3

#### Will pass—top of docket

Clifford, 12/30 (Mike, 12/30/2013, “Immigration Reform Supporters: “Positive Signs” Headed into 2014,” <http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2013-12-30/immigrant-issues/immigration-reform-supporters-positive-signs-headed-into-2014/a36538-1)>)

NEW YORK - Supporters of comprehensive immigration reform fell short of their goal in 2013, but several things happened in December to swing momentum in their direction, they say. The first positive sign, according to Jim Wallis, Sojourners president and founder, was the House and Senate working together to pass a budget bill.

And, while Speaker Boehner has said immigration reform would have to wait until next year, Wallis said there are signs Republicans are ready to act.

"I hear Republican leaders - Goodlatte from Judiciary - saying this will be a top priority in 2014," Wallis said. "John Boehner has hired a really talented aide to help with immigration - she knows the topic well, and she's for reform."

At his final 2013 news conference, President Obama called on House members to pass the immigration reform measure approved by the Senate, but Speaker Boehner has said he won't bring that version up for a vote.

Patty Kupfer, managing director, America's Voice, said key Republicans like Long Island Congressman Peter King either need to step up and co-sponsor the Senate-passed bill or reach across the aisle to a Democrat and craft a bill themselves.

"Peter King is probably one of about 40 Republicans who we see as critical to moving reform forward," Kupfer said, "and if they don't like what's on the table, they need to be able to produce something and say what they stand for."

#### ( ) Obama’s capital key to ensuring passage

Orlando Sentinel, 11/1 (11/1/2013, “What we think: It'll take both parties to clear immigration logjam,” <http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-11-01/news/os-ed-immigration-reform-congress-20131031_1_immigration-reform-comprehensive-reform-house-republicans>, JMP)

For those who thought the end of the government shutdown would provide a break from the partisan bickering in Washington, think again. The battle over comprehensive immigration reform could be every bit as contentious.

Polls show the popular momentum is there for comprehensive reform, which would include a path to citizenship for many of the nation's 11 million undocumented immigrants. But it'll take plenty of political capital from President Obama and leaders in both parties on Capitol Hill to make it happen.

Immigration-reform activists, who have been pushing for reform for years, are understandably impatient. This week police arrested 15 who blocked traffic at a demonstration in Orlando.

There are plenty of selling points for comprehensive immigration reform. An opportunity for millions of immigrants to get on the right side of the law. Stronger border security. The chance for law enforcement to focus limited resources on real threats to public safety, instead of nannies and fruit pickers. A more reliable work force to meet the needs of key industries. Reforms to let top talent from around the world stay here after studying in U.S. universities.

The Senate passed its version of comprehensive immigration in June. It includes all of the benefits above. Its path to citizenship requires undocumented immigrants to pay fines, learn English, pass a criminal background check and wait more than a decade.

So far, House Republicans have balked, taking a piecemeal rather than comprehensive approach. Many members fear being challenged from the right for supporting "amnesty."

Yet polls show the public supports comprehensive reform. In June, a Gallup poll found 87 percent of Americans — including 86 percent of Republicans — support a pathway to citizenship like the one outlined in the Senate bill.

Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio took flak from tea-party supporters for spearheading the comprehensive bill. Now, apparently aiming to mend fences, he says immigration should be handled piecemeal. He's politically savvy enough to know that's a dead end.

But comprehensive reform won't have a chance without President Obama making full use of his bully pulpit to promote it, emphasizing in particular all that undocumented immigrants would need to do to earn citizenship. House Democratic leaders will have to underscore the president's message.

And House Republican leaders will need to convince their members that comprehensive reform would be better for the economy, better for security, and better for the future of their party.

#### Plan kills CIR

Shear, 13

(Michael, NYT White house correspondent, 5/5, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all>)

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their American counterparts. Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security. “If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted.” “Drugs today are not very important to the U.S. public over all,” she added, “but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.” Representative Michael T. McCaul, a Texas Republican who is chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, has warned against the danger of drug cartels forming alliances with terrorist groups. “While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, drug gangs pose threats to peace and security. Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and Central America, “so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica.

#### Increasing green cards generates an effective base of IT experts- solves cybersecurity

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

¶ We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### Cyberterrorism will cause accidental launch that triggers the Dead Hand and nuclear war

Fritz 9 (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)  
  
*Direct control of launch*   
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ \*\*[they cut off the paragraph]\*\* “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

### 4

#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its domestic investment in small modular nuclear reactors.

#### The net benefits are China and politics – the CP doesn’t engage with Mexico which avoids the links to the DAs, but it solves warming. No ev in the 1AC indicates that Mexico is key.

### Relations

#### They’ll come through Canada

Mora 11 (Edwin Mora, a economist, professor and pro-independence leader in Puerto Rico, “Canadian Border Bigger Terror Threat Than Mexican Border, Says Border Patrol Chief”, May 18 2011, CNS News, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/canadian-border-bigger-terror-threat-mexican-border-says-border-patrol-chief, //nikp)

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency has apprehended more suspected terrorists on the nation’s northern border than along its southern counterpart, CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin said Tuesday. “In terms of the terrorist threat, it’s commonly accepted that the more significant threat” comes from the U.S.-Canada border, Bersin told a hearing of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security. Bersin attributed the situation, in part, to the fact that the U.S. and Canada do not share information about people placed on their respective “no-fly” lists. As a result, individuals deemed a threat who fly into one country may then cross the land border into the other. “Because of the fact that we do not share no-fly [list] information and the Canadians will not, we are more than we would like confronted with the fact where a [person designated as a] no-fly has entered Canada and then is arrested coming across one of our bridges into the United States,” he said. As it screens air travelers, the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration places individuals who are considered a threat to aviation on a no-fly list, which is a subset of the terrorist watchlist. Bersin’s comments came after the subcommittee’s ranking Republican, Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, asked him about the relative numbers of people apprehended along the northern and southern borders. He responded that the detentions and arrests along the border with Canada were “a small, small fraction” when compared to the number apprehended in the south. "That doesn’t mean that we don’t face significant threats” along the northern border, he added. CBP figures for fiscal year 2010 indicate that 447,731 illegal crossers were apprehended along the southwest border and 7,431 along the U.S.-Canada border. Cornyn noted during the hearing that the FY2010 arrests along the southwest border included 59,000 individuals from countries other than Mexico. Last March, the senator told a conference on border security that of those 59,000 people, 663 came “from special-interest countries like Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen and from countries that have been designated by the U.S. Department of State as state-sponsors of terror – Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan.” Speaking to reporters after Tuesday’s hearing, Bersin said his agency has recorded more cases of people with suspected terrorist backgrounds or links to terror organizations entering the U.S. from Canada than from Mexico. “That doesn’t mean that we’re not looking for it on both borders, south and north,” he said. Bersin said people who are on the no-fly list for a variety of reasons may enter Canada, “because they’re entitled under Canadian laws to do so, and then they attempt to cross into the United States” by way of bridge or tunnel border crossings. “CBP officers have stopped that,” he said, but without quantifying the number of suspected terrorist arrests by CBP. Bersin told reporters Canadian authorities do not act on no-fly list information provided by the U.S. government if it affects a Canadian citizen. This, he said, creates a security gap. “Under the Canadian charter – as that’s been interpreted to me – they do not believe that they can accept information that would affect Canadian citizens, and therefore don’t. “But we’re constantly working with our Canadian partners to develop mechanism and modes of information exchange [so] that, as far as legally possible, we can close that gap. And we’ll continue to do that.” ‘Known presence of terrorist organizations’ A December 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that “the risk of terrorist activity is high” on the northern border. The report noted that according to the assessment of the U.S. Border Patrol – a component of CBP – only 32 of the nearly 4,000 miles of the U.S.-Canada border “had reached an acceptable level of control” in 2010. The rest, it said, were “defined as vulnerable to exploitation due to issues related to accessibility and resource availability and, as a result, there is a high degree of reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone.” The GAO report also noted that in the Blaine sector – the Border Patrol sector that includes Oregon and the western half of Washington state – there is a “known presence of terrorist organizations” near the border. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton, who testified alongside Bersin Tuesday, told the Senate panel that his agency has about 1,500 enforcement and removal officers on the northern border – the “largest law-enforcement footprint of any U.S agency in Canada.” “We removed about 47,000 illegal aliens from the northern border region, roughly half of whom are criminal offenders,” added Morton. The issue of drug-smuggling over the northern border also came up during the hearing. In his prepared remarks, Bersin said that CBP interdicts around 40,000 pounds of illegal drugs each year at and between points of entry along the northern border.

#### Terrorists won’t use the border

Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)

One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department. Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.

#### No nuclear terror – tech

Chapman 12

(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, <http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html>)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

#### They can’t purchase bombs

Rusling 10 Matthew Rusling; Feb. 17 2010; “Nuclear or biological attack on U.S. unlikely: experts;” Xinhua English News http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-02/17/c\_13177523.htm RMJ

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16 (Xinhua) -- A nuclear or biological attack by terrorists on the United States is the country's greatest threat, but that is unlikely to happen, experts said. In a recent CNN interview, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a militant group like al-Qaida were the biggest threat to the UnitedStates. "The biggest nightmare that many of us have is that one of these terrorist member organizations within this syndicate of terror will get their hands on a weapon of mass destruction," she said. Clinton said al-Qaida remained "unfortunately a very committed,clever, diabolical group of terrorists who are always looking for weaknesses and openings." But while the threat is a horrific one, it is also one of the least likely to occur, experts said. For one thing, it is difficult for a non-state entity like al-Qaida -- and most countries, for that matter -- to build a deployable nuclear device, said Scott Stewart, vice president of tactical intelligence at global intelligence company Stratfor. Some states have access to universities, teams of scientists, huge facilities and large state budgets all aimed at creating a nuclear weapon, and even still those countries have difficulty in producing a usable weapon, he said. Purchasing a weapon of mass destruction would also be extremely difficult for militant groups, as the United States spends hefty sums -- around 1 billion dollars per year -- to track and buy fissile material in a bid to keep it off the market, he said. And if nuclear weapons-grade material were on the market, a number of nations would scramble to get their hands on it, creating heated competition, he said. As for U.S. attempts to protect the country from such a threat, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency have placed a high priority on the issue. "It's hard to determine if they are doing enough," he said. "There's only so much realistically you can do and always more could be done, but they have placed a great deal of resources into it."

#### Economic ties are high and resilient

Wilson 11 – MA in International Affairs @ American U, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs (Christopher, “Working Together,” Mexico Institute @ Woodrow Institute, Scholar)//BB

The economic ties between the United States and Mexico are reinforced by a large web of social networks. Thirty-two million U.S. residents, or one in ten, are of Mexican origin, including roughly 12 million people born in Mexico.10 Perhaps a million Americans live in Mexico, almost a fifth of all Americans who live abroad.11 Close to 15,000 Mexicans are pursuing college degrees in the United States, and 13 million Mexicans visit the U.S. in 2010.12 As the top tourist destination for U.S. travelers, an even larger 19 million U.S. residents visit Mexico each year.13 Just as social networks often facilitate the creation of commercial relationships within the United States, the depth and intensity of bilateral social integration spurs the development of economic links between the U.S. and Mexico. Import and export relationships, production sharing arrangements, and investment opportunities are all made easier by the relatively high level of understanding derived from the geographic and cultural proximity of United States and Mexico.

#### Our ev is predictive, relations are high now, and issues are compartmentalized – NGO’s fill in

Selee and Diaz-Cayeros 13 (Andrew and Alberto) “The Dynamics of US Mexico Relations” Mexico and the United States: the politics of partnership. 2013. Book

Yet positive factors favor prospects for more effective partnership and are likely to drive cooperation over time. First among these is the genuine interdependence of interests that underlies integration between the two countries. Everyday issues that need to be resolved – from the GM bailout to drug trafficking to natural disasters and water shortages at the border – create a dynamic of constant engagement around highly concrete topics that policymakers on the two sides of the border need to address. Moreover, the growing complexity of the relationship means that even when disputes arise among the two countries’ political leaders, progress continues along a number of other areas, driven by federal agencies, state, and local governments, and nongovernmental actors. Increasingly, interactions between the two countries take place simultaneously along a wide number of different points of engagement, which are largely independent of each other and have their own particular dynamics. Progress on one does not necessarily augur progress on another; nor does failure in one area lead to failure in another. Nonetheless, progress in depending engagement between the two countries will constantly be challenged by the persistent asymmetries that condition the relationship. The different in geopolitical realities of the two countries, the continuing inequality in average income between them and the dissimilar capacities of the two states are likely to continue to limit some efforts at greater cooperation. Recent tendencies have softened the impact of some of these asymmetries. Democratization in Mexico has made the political systems of the two countries more similar. Increased economic and social exchanges have built ties that mitigate some of the most visible asymmetries and forced the two countries to seek solutions to shared problems. Public opinion studies show how far the two countries have gone in recognizing their mutual interest in working together despite their differences, with ordinary citizens generally far ahead of political elites. Over the long term, interdependence will force the two countries closer and complexity will allow the relationship to lay down even deeper roots along multiple points of engagement. However, asymmetry will continue to create frictions and provide a brake on progress in cooperation. The relationship between the United States and Mexico will continuously deepen, but will be a process fraught with tension. The countries have ceased to be distant neighbors but as yet they remain far away from being strategic partners whose relationship is guided by a common vision of mutually beneficial shared outcomes.

#### Alt causes – poverty, Merida, and NAFTA

Hakim et al 2/1 – (Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue Andrés Rozental, member of the Advisor board, president of Rozental & Asociados in Mexico City and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas program at the Center for International Policy, Latin America Advisor, February 1, 2013 “Have Prospects for U.S.-Mexican Relations Improved?” <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3222>) DF

A: Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas program at the Center for International Policy: "All major issues at stake in U.S.-Mexico relations-immigration--labor, security, trade, environment, climate, human rights--will experience a turning point over the coming years. Immigration reform, likely to be accomplished, will improve relations depending on its final form; legal status would enfranchise U.S. Latinos, deepening democracy, and allow for travel. This will reunite families and increase citizen diplomacy between the two nations--both big pluses for the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Other changes will be mixed. Blind cooperation in the failed drug war through more Mérida Initiative funding will improve military/intelligence cooperation while propelling violence as it has for the past five years and adding to deteriorating human security conditions, militarization and corruption. Unfortunately, signs point to continuation without a comprehensive evaluation of the damage done to date--John Kerry reiterated support for the Bush-era plan in confirmation hearings and Medina-Mora's appointment sends a sign to Washington that the Peña Nieto government will accept the U.S. security aid strategy, since Medina-Mora was a point man for the drug war as attorney general in the first years of the Calderón government. Citizen calls for an end to support for Mexico's drug war will increase, but will face strong pushback from defense industry lobbies in Congress. As NAFTA reaches the 20-year mark, controversy surrounding outsourcing, jobs and union rights in the context of high U.S. unemployment will resurge--it will be interesting to see who Obama replaces Ron Kirk with as U.S. trade representative after Kirk took up the Republican banner of free-trade agreements. In Mexico, NAFTA evaluations cannot ignore the additional creation of millions of poor people, plunging real wages, the hugely skewed distribution of wealth and the environmental and social conflicts provoked by investment in extractive industries. The tension between corporate-led trade/investment promotion and the negative impact on workers will increase."

#### Alt cause – border security

Brzezinski 12 – former National Security Adviser (Zbigniew, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power”, 2012, pp. ??)

A more coercive US attitude and policy toward Mexican immigrants would heighten Mexican resentment, adversely affecting the overall US-Mexico partnership.After 9/11, the issue of border security has come to be seen as essential to homeland security; the spector of an Islamic terrorist crossing the border from Mexico enhanced popular cries to seal off the border completely. America’s decision to construct a wall/fence itself from Mexico as a mechanism to support border security has already stimulated anti-American sentiments. It evokes negative images of Israel’s construction of a “security barrier” in the West Bank or of the Berlin Wall. An internationally declining America is likely to become even more disturbed by the insecurity of its porous border with Mexico and the resulting immigration, inspiring a continuation of similar policies and creating a downward spiral for relations between the two neighbors.

### Warming

**Methane impact overstated**

**Soon 7** (Willie, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Atmospheric and Ocean Physics, ?Quantitative implications of the secondary role of carbon dioxide climate forcing in the past glacial-interglacial cycles for the likely future climatic impacts of anthropogenic greenhouse-gas forcings?, arXiv:0707.1276v1)

At this stage, it may be also relevant to point out that the popular scenario for potential episodic releases of methane hydrates to act as a strong positive feedback commonly tied  to seed atmospheric warming by CO2  may not be so straightforward. First, Milkov  (2004) has cautiously lowered the previously accepted high-estimate of global hydrate- bound gas from 21 x 1015 m3 of methane (or about 10,000 Gt of methane carbon) to a  much lower range between 1 to 5 x 1015 m3 of methane (or about 500-2500 Gt of  methane carbon). Next , Cannariato and Stott (2005) have recently challenged the  possibly incorrect interpretation of the large δ13C excursions in records of planktonic and  benthic foraminifera  as clathrate-derived methane release. A careful examination of the  atmospheric methane carbon isotope ratio (δ13CH4) from western Greenland ice margin  spanning the Younger Dryas-to-Preboreal transition by Schaefer et al. (2006) alsocould  not find support for either catastrophic or gradual marine clathrate emissions. Finally,  Bhaumik and Gupta (2007) have recently identified 5 major episodes of methane releases  starting since 3.6 million years BP in their ODP 997A site located on the crest of the  Blake Outer Ridge (about 200 km off the east coast of the United States from the shores  of Georgia and South Carolina) to be probably linked to reduced hydrostatic pressure  connected to lowered sea levels and intense glacial events roughly coinciding with  increased glaciation in the northern hemisphere.

**SO2 low now**

**IER 9** (Institute for Energy Research, 1 June 2009, The Facts About Air Quality and Coal-Fired Power Plants, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2009/06/01/the-facts-about-air-quality-and-coal-fired-power-plants/, RBatra)

America’s improving air quality is an untold success story. Even before Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, air quality had been improving for decades.[i] And since 1970, the six so-called criteria pollutants have declined significantly, even though the generation of electricity from coal-fired plants has increased by over 180 percent. [ii] (The “criteria pollutants” are carbon monoxide, lead, sulfur dioxide [SO2], nitrogen oxides [NOx], ground-level ozone, and particulate matter [PM]. They are called “criteria” pollutants because the EPA sets the criteria for permissible levels. [iii]) Total SO2 emissions from coal-fired plants were reduced by about 40 percent between 1970 and 2006, and NOx emissions were reduced by almost 50 percent between 1980 and 2006. On an output basis, the percent reduction is even greater, with SO2 emissions (in pounds per megawatt-hour) almost 80 percent lower, and NOx emissions 70 percent lower.

**Warming inevitable**

**Dickinson 9** (Pete, Global warming: Is it too late?, 26 August 2009, http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article19.php?id=1142, AMiles)

Note – paper cited is by Susan Solomon - atmospheric chemist working for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - Gian-Kasper Plattnerb- Group, Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics, UCLA - Reto Knuttic - Institute for Atmopsheric and Climate Science, PhD

New research is claiming that concentrations of carbon dioxide (the main greenhouse gas, CO2) will remain high for at least 1,000 years, even if greenhouse gases are eliminated in the next few decades. The climate scientists who produced this work assert that the effects of global warming, such as high sea levels and reduced rainfall in certain areas, will also persist over this time scale. (The findings are in a paper published in February in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by researchers from the USA, Switzerland and France, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0812721106 ) Most previous estimates of the longevity of global warming effects, after greenhouse gases were removed, have ranged from a few decades to a century, so this new analysis could represent a development with very serious implications, including political ones. For example, those campaigning for action on climate change could be disheartened and climate sceptics could opportunistically say that nothing should be done because it is now too late. The authors of the paper make various estimates of CO2 concentrations based on the year emissions are cut, assumed to be from 2015 to 2050. They make optimistic assumptions, for instance, that emissions are cut at a stroke rather than gradually, and that their annual rate of growth before cut-off is 2%, not the 3% plus witnessed from 2000-05. They then estimate what the effects would be on surface warming, sea level rise and rainfall over a 1,000-year period using the latest climate models. The results of the melting of the polar ice caps are not included in the calculations of sea levels, only the expansion of the water in the oceans caused by the surface temperature increase so, as the authors point out, the actual new sea level will be much higher. The best-case results for surface warming, where action is taken in 2015 to eliminate emissions, show that over 1,000 years the temperature rises from 1.3 to 1.0 degree centigrade above pre-industrial levels. The worst case, where action is delayed to 2050, predicts surface temperatures will increase from just under to just over four degrees by 2320 and then remain approximately constant for the rest of the millennium. High levels of CO2 persist in the atmosphere because, over long timescales, reduction of the gas is dependent on the ability of the oceans to absorb it, but there are limits to this due to the physics and chemistry of deep-ocean mixing. On the other hand, the amount of heat in the atmosphere that can be absorbed by the sea, the key way surface temperatures are decreased, is limited by the same scientific laws. As a result, carbon concentrations cannot fall enough to force temperatures down while there is simultaneously reduced cooling due to limited heat loss to the oceans.

**No impact to warming**

**Lomborg 8**—Director - Copenhagen Consensus Center Adjunct prof, Copenhagen Business School. (Björn, Warming warnings get overheated, 15 August 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange, AMiles)

Much of the global warming debate is perhaps best described as a constant outbidding by frantic campaigners, producing a barrage of ever-more scary scenarios in an attempt to get the public to accept their civilisation-changing proposals. Unfortunately, the general public – while concerned about the environment – is distinctly unwilling to support questionable solutions with costs running into tens of trillions of pounds. Predictably, this makes the campaigners reach for even more outlandish scares. These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

**Alt causes**

**Ecobridge 7** (http://www.ecobridge.org/content/g\_cse.htm, AG)

While carbon dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas, methane is second most important. According to the IPCC, Methane is more than 20 times as effective as CO2 at trapping heat in the atmosphere. US Emissions Inventory 2004 Levels of atmospheric methane have risen 145% in the last 100 years. [18] Methane is derived from sources such as rice paddies, bovine flatulence, bacteria in bogs and fossil fuel production. Most of the world’s rice, and all of the rice in the United States, is grown on flooded fields. When fields are flooded, anaerobic conditions develop and the organic matter in the soil decomposes, releasing CH4 to the atmosphere, primarily through the rice plants. US Emissions Inventory 2004 Water Vapor in the Atmosphere Increasing Water vapor is the most prevalent and most poweful greenhouse gas on the planet, but its increasing presence is the result of warming caused by carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases. (See NOAA's National Climate Data Center (NCDC) FAQ page) Water vapor holds onto two-thirds of the heat trapped by all the greenhouse gases.[129] As the Earth heats up relative humidity is able to increase, allowing the planet's atmosphere to hold more water vapor, causing even more warming, thus a positive feedback scenario. Because the air is warmer, the relative humidity can be higher (in essence, the air is able to 'hold' more water when its warmer), leading to more water vapor in the atmosphere, says the NCDC. There is much scientific uncertainty as to the degree this feedback loop causes increased warming, inasmuch as the water vapor also causes increased cloud formation, which in turn reflects heat back out into space. Nitrous oxide Another greenhouse gas is Nitrous oxide (N2O), a colourless, non-flammable gas with a sweetish odour, commonly known as "laughing gas", and sometimes used as an anaesthetic. Nitrous oxide is naturally produced by oceans and rainforests. Man-made sources of nitrous oxide include nylon and nitric acid production, the use of fertilisers in agriculture, cars with catalytic converters and the burning of organic matter. Nitrous oxide is broken down in the atmosphere by chemical reactions that involve sunlight. Deforestation After carbon emissions caused by humans, deforestation is the second principle cause of atmospheric carbn dioxide. (NASA Web Site) Deforestation is responsible for 20-25% of all carbon emissions entering the atmosphere, by the burning and cutting of about 34 million acres of trees each year. We are losing millions of acres of rainforests each year, the equivalent in area to the size of Italy. [22] The destroying of tropical forests alone is throwing hundreds of millions of tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year. We are also losing temperate forests. The temperate forests of the world account for an absorption rate of 2 billion tons of carbon annually. [3] In the temperate forests of Siberia alone, the earth is losing 10 million acres per year.

**Long timeframe means intervening actors and tech solve**

**Michaels 7** – Cato senior fellow. PhD in climatology. Former Research Professor of Environmental Sciences from the University of Virginia. (Patrick, 2/2, Live with Climate Change, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=7502, AG)

Consequently, the best policy is to live with some modest climate change now and encourage economic development, which will generate the capital necessary for investment in the more efficient technologies of the future. Fortunately, we have more time than the alarmists suggest. The warming path of the planet falls at the lowest end of today's U.N. projections. In aggregate, our computer models tell us that once warming is established, it tends to take place at a constant, not an increasing, rate. Reassuringly, the rate has been remarkably constant, at 0.324 degrees F per decade, since warming began around 1975. The notion that we must do "something in 10 years," repeated by a small but vocal band of extremists, enjoys virtually no support in the truly peer reviewed scientific literature. Rather than burning our capital now for no environmental gain (did someone say "ethanol?"), let's encourage economic development so people can invest and profit in our more efficient future. People who invested in automobile companies that developed hybrid technology have been rewarded handsomely in the past few years, and there's no reason to think environmental speculators won't be rewarded in the future, too.

**Climate impacts are overyhyped, nothing will happen for 300 years and even then it won’t be that bad, tech solves in the meantime**

**Lomborg 8** – Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated”, The Guardian, 8/15,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange

These **alarmist predictions are** becoming **quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities**, if it weren’t for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver **Tickell**, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a “catastrophe” and the beginning of the “extinction” of the human race. This **is** simply silly**.** His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, **Tickell has maxed out the campaigners’ scare potential** (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But **he is wrong**. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, **the IPCC predicts that,** by the end of the century, **sea levels will rise 18**-59 **centimetres – Tickell is** simply exaggerating by a factor ofup to400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland’s ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. **Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature**, say, **six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting tech**nology such as solar panels **will not have become economically competitive**). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world’s coastal infrastructure and much of the world’s farmland – “undoubtedly” causing billions to die. But **to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan**. **This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading,** mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years’ time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. **Tickell’s claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times** beyond wrong and misleading, **and**, of course, **made with** no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, **there will**, of course, also **be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; ag**ricultural **yields will** decline in the tropics, but **increase in the temperate zones**, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. **The** bottom line is that **benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs** (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). **Global warming will continue to be a net benefit** until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. **This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it** will not be a challenge to **our** civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

**No mechanisms for methane release and no impact  
Archer 5**(David, Dept. Geophysical Sciences @ U. Chicago, ?Methane hydrates and anthropogenic climate change?, http://geosci.uchicago.edu/~archer/reprints/archer.ms.hydrate\_rev.pdf)

We have defined a catastrophic methane release as one which occurs on a time scale  that is short relative to the atmospheric lifetime of methane, about a decade, generating a spike in atmospheric methane concentration that lasts about a decade.  Methane has a  stronger impact on the radiative balance of the earth, per molecule, than CO2, because of  its lower concentration.  The nightmare scenario would be the catastrophic release of a large fraction of the  thousands of Gton C in the ocean hydrate reservoir.  No one has proposed a mechanism  by which such a nightmare catastrophe could take place.  The largest landslide in the sea  floor record appears to be the Storegga slidedeposits off the coast of Norway.  This slide  could have released about 1 Gton C of methane.  Perhaps half of the methane in  sediments exists as bubbles, the other half as hydrate [Davie and Buffett, 2001].  Bubbles  have a small chance of escaping to the atmosphere, unless they are released in shallow  water, as for example in the Siberian margin [Shakhova et al., 2005].  Even if 1 Gton C of  methane reached the atmosphere catastrophically, the climate impact of this would be  relatively small.

Safe methane projects are funded now

**DoE 12** (US Department of Energy, Energy.gov, 2 May 2012, “US and Japan Complete Successful Field Trial of Methane Hydrate Production Technologies,”http://energy.gov/articles/us-and-japan-complete-successful-field-trial-methane-hydrate-production-technologies)

WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu announced today the completion of a successful, unprecedented test of technology in the North Slope of Alaska that was able to safely extract a steady flow of natural gas from methane hydrates – a vast, entirely untapped resource that holds enormous potential for U.S. economic and energy security.  Building upon this initial, small-scale test, the Department is launching a new research effort to conduct a long-term production test in the Arctic as well as research to test additional technologies that could be used to locate, characterize and safely extract methane hydrates on a larger scale in the U.S. Gulf Coast.

**greenhouse gas emissions will eventually overwhelm hydrogen sulfide**

**Stevens, 91**—William, Staff Writer for th e New York Times, “Not Using Fossil Fuels Could Add to Warming” Feb 7, 1991, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE7DA1430F934A35751C0A967958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2

Calculations Look 'Reasonable' The calculations "look very reasonable," said Dr. Robert J. Charlson, an atmospheric chemist at the University of Washington who is an expert on aerosols and climate. Dr. Charlson said that both he and Dr. Wigley are persuaded that the question of the aerosols' effect on global warming is "a sleeping giant of a sort." It is "something that has been missed, and the consequences are not trivial," he said. "It is going to complicate matters in terms of setting policy." Delegates from 130 countries are now meeting at Chantilly, Va., outside Washington, in the first negotiating sessions toward a treaty limiting emissions of greenhouse gases. Both Dr. Wigley and Dr. Charlson warned against using the aerosol effect as a justification for taking no action to reduce the burning of fossil fuels. For one thing, Dr. Charlson said, the cooling effect of the sulfur dioxide aerosols must be viewed as a temporary phenomenon "that has masked what's really going on in the temperature record." The average surface temperature of the Earth has been rising over the last decade and is now at a record level, although few scientists are yet ready to conclude that the warming has been caused by the greenhouse effect rather than other climatic factors. In the long run, Dr. Charlson said, failure to rein in the greenhouse gases would risk a dangerous warming despite the aerosol effect. Moreover, both he and Dr. Wigley pointed out, the cooling effect of the aerosols takes place mostly in the Northern Hemisphere, where most sources of aerosols are located, while the carbon dioxide and its warming effect are diffused around the globe. Big questions remain as to how the aerosols would affect weather patterns, Dr. Charlson said. That is crucial, since weather is what distributes heat around the planet. And Dr. Wigley wrote in his report that the very imbalance in aerosol effects between the Northern and Southern hemispheres is "potentially even more disruptive to the climate system than a uniformly distributed 'pure' greenhouse effect." For this reason, Dr. Wigley concluded, the effect of sulfur dioxide aerosols should not be seen as a benefit, but "as further reason for implementing controls on fossil fuel use." But much remains unknown about the aerosols, Dr. Hansen said, and for that reason it is difficult to gauge the real short-term effect they might have on global warming if the burning of fossil fuels declined.

**No WMD terrorism – no motive or capability – prefer empirics**

**Mueller ’11**. John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, “The Truth About al Qaeda”, 8/2/2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show, CMR

The chief lesson of 9/11 should have been that small bands of terrorists, using simple methods, can exploit loopholes in existing security systems. But instead, many preferred to engage in massive extrapolation: If 19 men could hijack four airplanes simultaneously, the thinking went, then surely al Qaeda would soon make an atomic bomb. As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems **breathtakingly unlikely** that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems **wildly unlikely** that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it **scarcely presents an existential**, or elephantine**, threat**. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included. That probability will remain unchanged unless terrorists are able to increase their capabilities massively -- and obtaining nuclear weapons would allow them to do so. Although al Qaeda may have dreamed from time to time about getting such weapons, no other terrorist group has even gone so far as to indulge in such dreams, with the exception of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which leased the mineral rights to an Australian sheep ranch that sat on uranium deposits, purchased some semi-relevant equipment, and tried to buy a finished bomb from the Russians. That experience, however, cannot be very encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. Even though it was flush with funds and undistracted by drone attacks (or even by much surveillance), Aum Shinrikyo abandoned its atomic efforts in frustration very early on. It then moved to biological weapons, another complete failure that inspired its leader to suggest that fears expressed in the United States of a biological attack were actually a ruse to tempt terrorist groups to pursue the weapons. The group did finally manage to release some sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that killed 13 and led to the group's terminal shutdown, as well as to 16 years (and counting) of pronouncements that WMD terrorism is the wave of the future. No elephants there, either.

**Our evidence is MUCH more qualified.**  
**Schulz, 10.** (GW Schulz on September 13, 2010 Center for Investigative Reporting, “Our List of Security Stories ThatMatter,”http://www.centerforinvestigativereporting.org/blogpost/20100913linkanalysisourlistofsecuritystoriesthatmattersept612)

Several news organizations and think tanks chose the 9/11 anniversary last week to release new examinations of homeland security policy in the United States. But arguably the most important came from the National Security Preparedness Group, led by influential leaders of the 9/11 Commission. Two widely recognized terrorism experts, Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, authored a report for the center that was made public on Sept. 10 titled “Assessing the Terrorist Threat.” They concluded that attacks involving nuclear or biological weapons are not likely, as are those aimed at so-called “soft targets,” such as shopping centers and malls in small cities. A major problem now involves the export of radicalized Americans to other parts of the world considered fronts in the war on terror. Overreactions to failed attacks here, they add, have played into the hands of jihadists.

**No retaliation**

**Bremmer 4—**IR prof, Columbia. Faculty member at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute. PhD in pol sci, Stanford (Ian, 11/13, Suppose a new 9/11 hit America . . ., http://www.newstatesman.com/200409130005, AG)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and "step up" efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from "the real war on terror". And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually "bouncing the rubble" in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme "unacceptable". However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable.

# 2NC

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:20)

#### The CCP has meticulously planned Chinese growth to account for slowdowns, but they require exports to buttress their economy – declining demand in the US and Europe forces them to Latin America – that’s Holland.

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#### Exports are key to the economy – downturn collapses the CCP’s hold on power which causes nuclear lashout and global draw-in. That outweighs on magnitude. CCP irrationality and the perceptive nature of the internal link mean we win timeframe: you can only die once.

#### Independently, they conceded the economy impact in the Buzan and Foot ev – Chinese slowdown collapses global growth which turns the case:

Global economic collapse forces countries to seek the cheapest energy solutions which discourages investment in expensive renewables. Economic collapse drives up prices for thorium which turns solvency. Independently, loose nukes result in global shutdowns of nuclear material markets which make it impossible to access source material for SMRs. Chinese lashout forces the US to shift their focus towards Asia which distracts Mexican relations, and it provides cover for terrorists to gain China’s loose nukes and direct them at the US.

### 2NC – CCP collapse (0:30)

#### **Internal instability causes CCP desperation and war over Taiwan**

Lewis 8 [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

#### That escalates

Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper) August 3, 2005, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html>)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### 2NC – AT: “Influence” high (retime)

#### US credibility is declining – even if they win that we’ve signed some trade deals, their ev doesn’t describe and compare trends of US and Chinese engagement holistically:

#### 1) Controversies prove – Snowden and spying destroyed US cred and encouraged economic counterbalancing which empowered anti-Capitalist groups who spun the US as imperialist. That caused Latin America to turn towards other trade powers in protest.

#### 2) Their ev cites rhetoric, not action – that’s not sufficient to trigger the DA

Padgett 5/27

[Timothy. Latin America Reporter for TIME “Why China Is Behind Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America” WLRN – South Florida 5/27/13 <http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latin-america>]

There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a former White House national security advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas.¶ “No it’s not,” he says. “President Obama’s trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show America’s interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America.”¶ Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in Washington recently, when he declared that the hemisphere “matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any time in American history.”

#### 3) Security focus collapses economic engagement – the plan reverses that

Fossett 5/28

(Katelyn, “In U.S.-Mexico Relations, a Shift from Security to Economy,” Interpress Service News, [www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/](http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/))

Development’s Achilles heel¶ Still, for a country like Mexico that is still struggling with issues of citizen security and rampant crime, many suggest that economic growth would have to start from the bottom, with more robust social programmes and safety nets, before the international community becomes too optimistic about economic and trade booms.¶ Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center, calls Latin America “far behind” in developing policies that might leverage inclusive growth.¶ “There is not a sense of shared responsibility … when your social policy is remittance, when your lack of social policy is permitted,” she told reporters on Friday. The region, she said, needs “a widespread recognition of the role the private sector needs to play in paying taxes, improving government … [and] institutions.”¶ In a telephone interview with IPS, she noted that the U.S. relationship with Central America is likely to remain more focused on security concerns.¶ “There is a growing consensus in the development community that sustainable growth can’t and will not happen unless levels of violence are brought under control,” she told IPS.¶ The World Bank recently called citizen insecurity the “Achilles’ heel of development” in Latin America.¶ Members of the U.S. Congress and advocacy groups here are also wary of turning a blind eye to human rights concerns in Mexico.¶ “The dire human rights situation in Mexico is not going to solve itself,” Maureen Meyer, a senior associate for Mexico and Central America with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), an advocacy group, said in a statement.¶ “As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus on how best to support and defend human rights in Mexico.”¶ In a press release issued last week, WOLA expressed agreement with a letter from 23 members of Congress to Secretary of State John Kerry that stressed that “[t]he human rights crisis will not improve until there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexico’s security forces, and more government agents held responsible for the human rights violations they commit.”¶ Even as the focus of U.S.-Mexico relations turns to economics, there is no broad agreement on how exactly a shift toward trade relations will strengthen the “economic competitiveness” of both countries.¶ “Part of the challenge is that we have this term, but we have a laundry list of issues that could fit into that term,” the Mexico Institute’s Chris Wilson said.¶ “What we still don’t have is a coherent agenda or a way in which the leadership from the top level can engage the public or business community or civil society … and create something more [meaningful],” he told IPS.

### 2NC – AT: LA not key to China econ

#### Latin America’s key:

#### 1) Export markets – China needs new markets because US demand is down

Myers and Hongbo 13 (Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue, Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, each answering a question from the Inter-American Dialogue “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue: "Latin America became a strategically important market for Chinese exporters a few years ago following decreases in demand for Chinese goods from Europe and the United States. Chinese exports to Europe fell 9 percent in 2011 in comparison with export levels in 2010, for example, and exports to the United States fell 5 percent. As U.S. and European demand continues to lag, Latin American nations should expect sustained interest in their markets and new market- and efficiency-seeking investments. As China continues its process of industrial upgrading, Latin America will also see more in the way of high-tech goods, as well as marketing of distinctly Chinese brands. Chinese cars are already being sold in several Latin American countries, including Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. And Chinese cell phones and computers are increasingly popular among Latin American consumers. As the former LAC director general at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yang is uniquely familiar with both the promises and pitfalls of trade with Latin America. While Latin America remains an appealing market for exports, Chinese producers and officials are painfully aware of growing protectionism in response to China's market-seeking endeavors. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited nationalization and trade protectionism trends among the top 20 notable events in the region in 2012. China expects to avoid protectionist measures by building mutually beneficial, 'win-win' trade relations. Chinese government and commercial entities in Latin America will indeed be working to build stronger trade relations in the coming years." A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."

#### 2) PRC proves

Ellis 11 (Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” NDU press. 1st quarter 2011 <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf> SCTM)

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company.¶ Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14

### 2NC – AT: African resources solve

#### China needs Latin American resources

Caspary 8 (Georg, advisor to the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala and Bolivia, “China Eyes Latin American Commodities,” Yale Global Online, Online, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-eyes-latin-american-commodities>, accessed 7/16/13) PE

Latin America is increasingly attractive as a source for large emerging economies with rising commodity import needs. The recent large find of oil and gas in Brazilian waters has only added to that attraction.¶ Thus, with their large reserves of commodities, especially non-renewable resources in high demand from the global market, Latin American countries should be in the catbird’s seat, calling shots and setting prices. Yet, despite the allure of the region for resource-hungry emerging economies like China, the cards are not necessarily stacked in Latin America’s favor. Unless the region develops policies of sustainable development and transparent transactions, the advantages it enjoys from its riches could prove to be limited.¶ Latin America produces 47 percent of the world’s soybean crop, 40 percent of copper and 9.3 percent of its crude oil – and in five years Brazilian oil will add to that. China needs an increasing amount of such commodities both as inputs in its fast industrialization process and for private consumption, given the nation’s rapidly rising living standards. Its commodity imports are set to rise at lower double-digit rates until at least 2020. Annual average oil and copper import growth rates have recently been 10 times higher than average import growth rates for the rest of the world.

#### African resources aren’t enough – China needs raw materials and export markets in Latin America

Valencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america>, accessed 7/17/13) PE

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.”

### 2NC – AT: No CCP lashout

#### Yes lashout:

#### 1) Anarchy and fragmentation

Yee and Storey 2. [Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist University and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5]

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario – nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

#### 2) Diversionary theory – causes crisis manufacturing

Friedberg 2011

(July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

Such fears of aggression are heightened by an awareness that anxiety over a lack of legitimacy at home can cause nondemocratic governments to try to deflect popular frustration and discontent toward external enemies. Some Western observers worry, for example, that if China’s economy falters its rulers will try to blame foreigners and even manufacture crises with Taiwan, Japan or the United States in order to rally their people and redirect the population’s anger. Whatever Beijing’s intent, such confrontations could easily spiral out of control. Democratic leaders are hardly immune to the temptation of foreign adventures. However, because the stakes for them are so much lower (being voted out of office rather than being overthrown and imprisoned, or worse), they are less likely to take extreme risks to retain their hold on power.

#### 3) Legitimacy is staked on growth

Abebe et al 10

[Dan – Prof Law @ U of C Law. “International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” Problem” The Virginia Journal of Intl Law, Vol 50. Winter 2010 ln]

First, since the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served as the basis for the party's authority, the CCP has adopted economic growth as the central justification for its one-party rule. The CCP has pegged its political future to a type of "performance legitimacy" n12 - it governs because it can provide faster growth and higher standards of living than any alternative form of central authority. In Eastern China, the CCP's approach has been a nearly unqualified success. Special coastal economic zones, favorable banking policies, and massive decentralization of government have combined to spur blistering economic growth. Western China, however, has been left starkly behind: per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Western China is less than half of what it is in Eastern China. The result has been rising income inequality, social instability, and dramatic divisions between East and West, rural and city, and peasants and urban residents, along with the creation of a roaming underclass of Western Chinese seeking work in the coastal cities. n13 Worse still, these social schisms coincide with ethnic and religious fault lines: Western China is home to many ethnic minority groups that harbor substantial animosity toward CCP rule. Poorer conditions in the West have created the political environment for the emergence of separatist movements. Brisk economic growth in Western China has thus become a political imperative for the CCP, and the CCP has [\*330] prioritized it accordingly. China is likely to balk at any international agreement that might imperil this growth. Second, as a result of its growth-driven delegation of power, the CCP suffers from a surprising (for such a centralized government) erosion of state capacity: the provinces often ignore the central government's directives, frequently without meaningful consequences. n14 The political structure of the CCP and the institutional structure of China's government are sometimes overlapping or redundant and, in many places, lack effective vertical or horizontal accountability. The environmental regulatory agencies are often subordinate to the very agencies they are intended to regulate. Province-level CCP officials are often evaluated (both locally and in Beijing) by their ability to produce high levels of economic growth, not their commitment to environmental protection. Although the CCP has recently tried to recentralize power and rationalize the governance structure, n15 the center's capacity to enforce environmental regulations on the provinces is much weaker than in a typical industrialized state. The existing structural relationship between the provinces and Beijing often results in a chronic inability on the part of the CCP to provide public goods like environmental protection, an inability it will not be able to reverse without incurring substantial costs. Finally, there is reason to believe that the vast majority of economic and scientific projections have substantially underestimated China's future carbon emissions by failing to account for heterogeneity among provinces. Eastern China is already highly industrialized and reasonably wealthy; there is every reason to expect that it will begin to move towards cleaner technologies and shift economic production away from industry and towards services (which are generally less energy and carbon-intensive). n16 Western China, by contrast, is poorer and more agrarian, and the typical development pattern for such an area involves a shift towards greater industrialization and higher per capita energy consumption (and carbon production). Indeed, this is precisely the direction in which Western China is moving. n17 Every quantitative forecast of Chinese emissions - save for two important exceptions - uses only national-level data, a methodological weakness that can wash out distinctions between East and West. Of the [\*331] two studies that employ sub-national data, one projects higher emissions than any of the national-level studies; the other projects much higher emissions than any other study. n18 We read this as suggesting that Chinese carbon emissions over the forthcoming several decades may be significantly greater than the standard models have anticipated, with correspondingly higher costs to China from any agreement to curb carbon emissions. In light of the importance of economic growth to the CCP, the internal structure of Chinese governance, and the need to develop Western China, the prospects for China choosing to join such an agreement in the immediate future seem slim. This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the general importance of economic growth to the CCP, the distribution of growth within China, and the social and economic difficulties generated by the CCP's hyper-growth policies. Part II analyzes the CCP's internal environmental enforcement capacity and argues that China would encounter substantial domestic challenges in implementing a climate accord, even if it chooses to sign one. Part III critiques the assumptions underlying quantitative forecasts of Chinese carbon emissions and suggests that future emissions may exceed conventional projections by substantial margins. Part IV canvasses extant potential frameworks for an international climate change agreement and argues that they are likely to be unsuitable to one or more of the relevant parties. Our conclusion is a pessimistic one: it will be difficult to convince China to join a meaningful international climate agreement in the near future under the best of circumstances. The Two Chinas, coupled with China's internal political dynamics, present circumstances that are hardly ideal. I. The Chinese Growth Imperative Modern China has reinvented itself on a foundation of kudzu-like economic growth. Where Marxism once served as the unifying national ideology, the CCP has substituted wealth generation and prosperity as the touchstones of the regime and suggested that the Chinese people judge the legitimacy of CCP rule by the increases in their own standards of living. Economic growth in China has been spectacular, but it has also been highly uneven. Eastern, coastal provinces have become wealthy, while central and western provinces have lagged far behind. In effect, there is no longer simply "China." There is now Eastern China, which is urban, industrialized, and relatively prosperous, and Western China, [\*332] which is rural, agrarian, and relatively poor. This divergence in economic outcomes - a divergence that in places coincides with pre-existing ethnic and religious fault lines - poses a serious threat to social stability within China. n19 In response, the CCP has begun an aptly named "Western Development Program" in an attempt to prioritize economic growth, encourage national integration, and curb nationalist unrest in Western provinces. Accordingly, the governing regime will be reluctant to join a climate agreement that might contribute to greater instability by stunting crucial economic development in Western China. A. Foundations of CCP Rule: Economic Growth Since 1949, China has been governed by the autocratic CCP, dominated by Chairman Mao's conception of Marxism and designed to bring "socialist glory" to China while preserving party rule. After the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death in 1976, however, the CCP, led by Deng Xiaoping, began to move away from the Marxist ideological foundation that served as the legitimating discursive force for CCP authority. n20 Concerned with increasing levels of apathy toward communism and questions about its efficacy as the governing regime, n21 the CCP turned to two new sources of authority and legitimacy to galvanize support among the populace and strengthen its hold on power. The first of these was a new Chinese nationalism. The second was an emphasis on continued economic growth - a type of "performance legitimacy" n22 - as a benchmark and measure of the regime's success. From the late 1970s until the suppression of student-led democratic protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng and the CCP moved slowly toward a reform of China's centralized economic policies and internal governance structure. Deng and some of the reformers began to argue that the Chinese people wanted a higher standard of living, technological dynamism, and economic efficiency, not more ideology and excessive bureaucracy. To be economically successful, they argued, China needed the CCP's one-party rule to ensure stability and regain international prestige. In the words of one scholar, "in the most fundamental sense ... China's economic reform strategy has been guided by a strategic [\*333] vision at the top of the political system. This vision links China's security, global influence, and domestic stability to the state of its economy." n23 Sustained economic growth is paramount for the continuation of the CCP, the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, and the pursuit of China's national interests in international politics. n24 The CCP's reform strategy has been marked by incremental opening of the domestic economy, beginning with agriculture in the late 1970s and continuing through China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. n25 During the 1980s, the CCP delegated a significant amount of authority from the central government to the provinces and cities, freeing local actors - province and city-level officials - to develop policies that encouraged economic growth independent of the center. n26 After a temporary delay in reforms after Tiananmen Square, the 1990s saw the CCP commit to the creation of a market system, the privatization of some state-owned enterprises, and the development of the private sector. At the turn of the century, the CCP began to embrace private entrepreneurs and "retreat from economic administration to economic regulation as the core economic function of government." n27 From a national perspective, the CCP's economic reforms are an unqualified success. Fueled by these reforms, the Chinese economy has produced tremendous economic growth and a rapidly improving standard of living for many of China's citizens (in addition to severe consequences for the environment). Between 1978 and 2000, "overall per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant yuan roughly quadrupled." n28 Today, China has the world's second largest economy by purchasing power parity, surpassing Japan, India, and Germany. n29 It has the world's largest foreign capital reserves. n30 It enjoys a trade surplus of [\*334] $ 163.3 billion with the United States. n31 It is a leading destination for foreign direct investment, n32 and has become more integrated into the world economy through its membership in the WTO. By almost every economic measure, the CCP's economic policies and drive for modernization have produced tremendous aggregate gains for China and its citizens. The CCP's policies have also created a consumer society in the formerly Marxist China. From telephones to televisions, newspapers to the internet, and automobiles to overseas travel, the CCP has brought to the Chinese people access to information, goods, and technology that were unimaginable during the Maoist era. n33 The CCP's economic policies have reduced the role of the state in the affairs of daily life, leaving ordinary citizens more free to engage in social and economic activities. In so doing, the CCP has reinforced the norm that prioritizing hyper-growth polices and ensuring economic development are the party's overriding responsibilities. China is hardly unique in favoring continued economic growth; there are few nations on earth that are not attempting to grow their economies and produce wealth for their citizens. In China, however, economic growth is not merely a matter of policy. Growth, particularly in certain geographic regions, is viewed by the CCP as a political imperative, integral to the regime's survival. As subsequent discussion will demonstrate, this focus on economic growth significantly impacts the CCP's incentives to curb environmental degradation and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:55)

#### Latin American imports are finite and carefully calibrated to play to the strengths of a variety of trade partners. The aff swings the pendulum away from China, decreasing their exports to Latin America and hurting their economy – that’s Holland.

#### Their “not zero sum” arguments don’t assume the nuance of the link – we agree that trade and relations are not zero sum, but the aff’s [relations/multilat] advantage proves they substantially bolster the US’s regional influence by overcoming decades of perceived colonial paternalism. I’ll make it pretty clear here – our link is based off of the relations advantage they claim – US investment in Mexico is seen as altruistic. Other countries in Latin America view US unilateral concessions on the warming debate as evidence of the US trying to pay back its burden to the world for polluting. All their ev about developing countries modeling the plan suggests that it’s a way the US can get back into the world’s good graces.

#### That signal of reconciliation shifts regional consumption patterns away from Chinese goods – that’s Ellis. Proximity incentivizes states to purchase from the US as long as they no longer fear American manipulation of their markets

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### Empirics prove that trade credibility, not net trade, is the determining factor in market choices – Latin America will gravitate towards the US regardless of actual market competition

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – AT: Nuclear terror

#### No nuclear terror – tech barriers and no incentive – acquiring scientists, capital, and uranium is transparent – they’ll be caught or fail – that’s Chapman.

#### Prefer our ev – accounts for empirics. No non-state actor has ever used a nuke – their ev is from hyperbolic security contractors and right wing think tanks – means they’re not credible because they’re politically motivated.

#### And no incentive to use nukes – goals

Kapur 8

(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact be­have rationally, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too de­structive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga­nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home­land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter­productive for the terrorists in this scenario.

#### They’d use conventional weapons – empirics prove no miscalc

Mueller 8

John Mueller, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1 <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>

Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005).

### 2NC – AT: Border k2 counterterror

#### Terrorists won’t use the border – that’s Barry and Mora – best statistics prove. They’ll go through Canada because we have laxer border controls with them.

#### Prefer our evidence – their Barry evidence is in the context of immigration enforcement trading off with DHS counterterror activities which means they’d leave the border but Willis about requires strengthening security on the border to improve counterterror cred which is a straight contradiction.

#### That proves legal immigration is a huge alt cause – terrorists could just apply for the aff’s visas. This means either a) they can’t solve or b) they make terrorism more likely

McCombs and Steller 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, <http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html>)

Over the last two decades, almost all of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on legal visas or were allowed to come in without a visa, said Alden, of the Council on Foreign Relations. "These are people that come on airplanes," said Alden, author of "The Closing of the American Border," which explains how the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. And over the last four to five years, the terrorist plots have increasingly involved people already in the United States - citizens and legal residents, he said. "The notion of the (Southwest) border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years," Alden said. Not only is the U.S. side of the border heavily guarded, but the Mexican government makes an extraordinary effort to prevent terrorists from coming through its country. For instance, Mexico shares real-time information with the U.S. about airline passengers arriving in Mexico to make sure they don't include potential terrorists, Alden said. The Mexican drug-smuggling organizations have no interest in allowing smuggling routes to be used by terrorist organizations either, he said. "If it is discovered that a terrorist that carried out an attack in the United States came across the Mexican border, then the response would be further fortification of that border that shuts down smuggling routes and cuts into the profits," he said. Being associated with terrorist groups would be very bad for business for drug-smuggling organizations, said Sylvia Longmire, a drug-war analyst and author. Proof of a terrorist coming through Mexico would have dire consequences for the Mexican government, too, she said. But that point of view ignores the fact that terrorist groups and Latin American drug smugglers sometimes do business with each other and therefore have connections, said Braun, the former DEA operations chief, who now runs a security-consulting firm, Spectre Group International. "Hezbollah is now heavily involved in the global cocaine trade," Braun said. "Most of the cocaine they're involved in distributing is heading toward Europe, but they're affiliating with the same cartels sending drugs to the United States." That isn't to say the groups share an ideology, but simply that they have the connections needed to exploit smuggling routes into the United States. Also, people from the Middle East tend to have dark hair, dark eyes and olive skin, like most Latin Americans, so they can easily blend in, he said. "On a moonless night at two in the morning, there's not a lot of due diligence going on when the coyotes and gatekeepers are moving human traffic across that border," Braun said. Canada is a more likely crossing point because that country allows in more people as refugees and asylum seekers, said Henry Willis, a senior policy researcher on homeland security at the Rand Corp. "To regard the Southwestern border as the 'frontline against terrorism,' as the Border Patrol does, is folly," wrote Barry, of the Center for International Policy, in a recent report. People have talked about terrorists crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, but Anthony Coulson, who retired as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Tucson office last year, has seen hardly any evidence. "Through the years I can probably count on my fingers on one hand the number of times that there was some type of terrorist activity associated with the border," Coulson said. "It just doesn't happen."

#### But the terminal impact is fearmongering

McCombs and Steller, 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article\_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html)

A turning political tide has renewed fears that raged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks - that terrorists will sneak into the country across the U.S.-Mexico border. Nobody disputes that's possible, but analysts and government officials say terrorists plotting to kill Americans are more likely to use other routes into the country, if they're not here already. It's much more common for people convicted in the U.S. of crimes connected to international terrorism to have been U.S. citizens or legal residents, or come into the country on visas. "There is no serious evidence that the U.S.-Mexico border is a significant threat from terrorism," said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank based in New York. Claims of terrorist threats on the Southwest border distract legislators and policymakers from addressing long-term solutions to drug smuggling and illegal immigration, said Tom Barry, senior analyst at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "It's politically motivated," Barry said, "playing on that sense of fear that certain people are susceptible to." But proponents of tougher border enforcement say protecting Americans against terrorism motivates them, not politics. "There's an enormous risk," said Michael Braun, who retired as chief of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008. Members of Hezbollah, for example, "are absolute masters at identifying existing smuggling infrastructures on many borders around the world where they operate." The State Department's 2009 "Country Reports on Terrorism" found that "no known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory." The State Department said that there was no evidence of ties between Mexican organized crime and international terrorist groups. But it warns: "The violence attributed to organized-crime groups on the border, however, continued to strain Mexico's law-enforcement capacities, creating potential vulnerabilities that terrorists seeking access to the United States could exploit." Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu emphasized the risk of terrorists crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. in a May 26 open letter to President Obama. "If the majority of regular illegal immigrants can sneak into America, what does this say about the ability of terrorist sleeper cells?" Babeu wrote. "The porous U.S.-Mexican border is the gravest national-security threat facing America." Hiding in a car trunk In his letter to the president, Babeu said thousands of illegal immigrants hailing from "special-interest countries" make the U.S.-Mexico border a national-security threat. "In some cases, we have confirmed their troubling ties to terrorism," Babeu wrote. "Yet for those we apprehend, how many today live amongst us?" The Border Patrol apprehended an average of 339 people from "special-interest countries" - those that warrant special handling based on terrorism risk factors - at the U.S.-Mexico border each year over the past six years, Homeland Security data show. That's less than 1 percent each year of the total apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border, Homeland Security figures show. None of the 2,039 people arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border in that span presented a credible terrorist threat, Homeland Security officials say. Homeland Security monitors, analyzes and gathers intelligence about potential threats but at this time "does not have any credible information on terrorist groups operating along the Southwest border," said department spokesman Matt Chandler. Among the 36 people convicted by the U.S. Justice Department of charges relating to international terrorism last year, none came into the United States from Mexico. Half were U.S. citizens, most of them naturalized from countries such as Sudan or Somalia. Seven were extradited from other countries, while three were captured abroad by American forces. The others came to the United States on visas, or, in one case, were arrested while trying to come into the United States legally at a port of entry on the Canadian border.

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It was just politics, but I don’t have the speech, so you’re out of luck